This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a ‘pay-for-percentile’ or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed, so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection.
Data and analysis files: (hosted at ICPSR)
JEL codes: C93, I21, J45, M52, O15
Pre-analysis plan and trial registry: Leaver, Ozier, Serneels, and Zeitlin 2018. “Recruitment, effort, and retention effects of performance contracts for civil servants: Experimental evidence from Rwandan primary schools.” AEA RCT Registry. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2565-5.0
Recommended citation: Leaver, Clare, Owen Ozier, Pieter Serneels, and Andrew Zeitlin. "Recruitment, effort, and retention effects of performance contracts for civil servants: Experimental evidence from Rwandan primary schools." American Economic Review 111, no. 7 (2021): 2213-46.